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The international tax regime was recently sweepingly reformed. In 2018, the 
Multilateral Instrument (MLI) entered into force, modifying thousands of bilateral 
double taxation treaties (DTTs) in substance and procedure. The MLI convention is 
part of the OECD’s tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) agenda and resulted 
from a concerted, inclusive and multilateral effort initiated by the G20 after the global 
financial crisis to curb international corporate tax avoidance. By August 2019, 89 
countries, including all G20 countries except Brazil and the United States, had signed 
the MLI. In spite of its scope and ambition, few outside the tax community have taken 
notice. That is unfortunate, because the MLI can provide valuable lessons for ongoing 
multilateral efforts to reform international investment law. 
 
The international tax and investment regimes have much in common. As recently as 
2011, UNCTAD referred to DTTs and bilateral investment treaties (BITs) jointly as 
international investment agreements.1 That makes sense. Whereas BITs protect foreign 
investment against undue regulatory interference by promising compensation for 
unlawful expropriation or discriminatory treatment, DTTs protect foreign investment 
more narrowly against undue fiscal interference by allocating the right to tax between 
investors’ home and host countries to avoid double taxation. In addition, both regimes 
share the same decentralized structure. They are based on thousands of bilateral 
agreements concluded over multiple decades that share similar principles (inspired by 
earlier OECD Draft Conventions) but differ in their fine print. Finally, both regimes 
have recently faced significant legitimacy crises that pitted corporate interests against 
those of taxpayers. BITs have been criticized for prioritizing private profits over public 
regulatory autonomy, and DTTs have been attacked for enabling fiscal evasion and tax 
base erosion.  
 
Given these commonalities, developments in one field can inspire action in the other. 
The MLI represents the international tax regime’s response to its legitimacy crisis. It 
constitutes a sophisticated attempt to achieve an ambitious multilateral reform in a 
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decentralized regime built on bilateral treaties. As such, it offers three useful lessons 
that can guide investment law reformers. 
 
 The MLI modifies but does not replace bilateral DTTs, leaving the regime’s 
decentralized architecture in place. The MLI is an opt-in agreement similar to 
the Mauritius Convention on Transparency in investor-state arbitration, but is 
more ambitious in scope. It introduces changes to DTTs’ preambles, adds new 
substantive provisions and strengthens enforcement, including through a new 
optional arbitration mechanism. The OECD has set up an online database to 
resolve the ensuing complexities of having to read DTTs in conjunction with 
the MLI. For investment lawyers, the mechanics of the MLI constitute an 
attractive alternative to a multilateral treaty that seeks to replace BITs (like the 
failed 1998 Multilateral Agreement on Investment). An agreement modeled on 
the MLI would preserve the bilateral structure of the investment regime, while 
introducing ambitious, efficient and multilaterally coordinated modifications to 
all covered BITs.  
 
 The MLI carefully updates thousands of DTTs in substance and procedure to 
address the regime’s legitimacy concerns. While recent DTTs strike an explicit 
balance between avoiding double taxation whilst ensuring taxation, older DTTs 
contain imprecise language that facilitates treaty shopping and abuse resulting 
in double non-taxation. The MLI closes these loopholes and aligns past treaties 
with today’s best practices. The investment regime would benefit from a similar 
modernization, since most BITs were concluded prior to 2000 and failed to 
balance investment protection with states’ regulatory autonomy. An MLI-style 
reform could thus effectively update the outdated stock of agreements in 
substance and procedure and align older investment agreements with current 
best practices. 
 
 The MLI provides a carefully balanced design to combine mandatory minimum 
standards with the flexibility to accommodate diverging state preferences. On 
the one hand, the MLI mandates a set of substantive and procedural obligations 
to achieve the reform’s objective of curbing DTT abuse. On the other hand, it 
provides flexibility on all other matters to contract out or around the MLI. This 
makes the treaty attractive to signatories whose preferences may diverge on 
selected issues. For example, the MLI’s arbitration mechanism is optional. A 
similar design choice could facilitate an ambitious investment law reform. 
Governments could agree on a set of mandatory investment protections (e.g., 
on expropriation) and exceptions (e.g., on police powers), set out common 
procedural standards (e.g., on authoritative interpretations) and clarify grey 
areas (e.g. on valuation of damages). More controversial aspects, such as higher 
protective standards, investment liberalization or the modalities of investor-
state dispute settlement, could take the form of opt-in or opt-out mechanisms.  
 
The MLI constitutes a template for a creative and ambitious investment law reform that 
goes beyond the narrow procedural fixes thus far contemplated in ongoing UNCITRAL 
Working Group III talks. The MLI is multilateral in nature, but preserves the regime’s 
bilateral architecture. It addresses legitimacy concerns comprehensively, eschewing a 
rigid distinction between procedure and substance, but remains tailored in scope. It sets 
minimum standards, but does not require agreement on all issues. In short, the MLI 
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invites investment lawyers to learn from the international tax regime in considering 
novel and flexible ways of squaring bilateralism with multilateralism in investment law 
reform. 
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